Objective: This paper presents additional considerations related to organization and safety culture extracted from recent human error incidents in Korea, such as station blackout(i.e., SBO) in Kori#1. Background: Safety culture has been already highlighted as a major cause of human errors after 1986 Chernobyl accident. After Fukushima accident in Japan, the public acceptance for nuclear energy has taken its toll. Organizational characteristics and culture became elucidated as a major contributor again. Therefore many nuclear countries are re-evaluating their safety culture, and discussing any preparedness and its improvement. On top of that, there was an SBO in 2012 in the Kori#1. Korean public feels frustrated due to the similar human errors causing to a catastrophe like Fukushima accident. Method: This paper reassesses Japan's incidents, and revisits Korea's recent incidents. It focuses on the analysis of the hazards rather than the causes of human errors, the derivation of countermeasures, and their implementation. The preceding incidents and conclusions from Japanese experience are also re-analyzed. The Fukushima accident was an SBO due to the natural disaster such as earthquakes and a successive tsunami. Unlike the Fukushima accident, the Kori#1 incident itself was simple and restored without any loss and radioactive release. However, the fact that the incident was deliberately concealed led to massive distrust. Moreover, the continued violation of rules and organized concealment of the accident are serious signs of a new distorted type of human errors, blatantly revealing the cultural and fundamental weakness of the current organization. Result: We should learn from Japanese experiences who had taken pride in its safety technology and fairly high confidence in safety culture. Japan's first criticality accident in JCO facility splashed cold water on that confidence. It has turned out to be a typical case revealing the problems in the organization and safety culture. Since Japan has failed to gain lessons and countermeasure, the issue persists to the Fukushima incident. Conclusion: Safety culture is not a specific independent element, which makes it difficult to either evaluate it properly or establish countermeasures from the lessons. It may continue to expose similar human errors such as concealment of incident and manipulation of bad data. Application: Not only will this work establish the course of research for organization and safety culture, but this work will also contribute to the revitalization of Korea's nuclear industry from the disappointment after the export contract to UAE.
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